Okta Cross App Access on AgentCore, part 2: all traffic through one Gateway, Cedar policies in default-deny, and denied calls never redeem a token
Part 1 covered how agents get short-lived grants; part 2 moves token exchange into the gateway, adds tool-level policy and gives a second agent read-only scope.
// Key points
- All agent traffic goes through one AgentCore Gateway whose inbound authorizer accepts only ID-JAGs issued to that agent; token exchange moves to the Gateway, so the agent's execution role no longer needs exchange or secret permissions
- AgentCore Policy runs Cedar in ENFORCE mode, default-deny, binding each tool to the agent's client ID and delegated scope (for example xaa:write) before any tool runs; denied calls never redeem the ID-JAG
- A second reporting agent on Amazon EKS has its own Okta registration and only xaa:read; OpenTelemetry spans cover every hop and Okta's System Log streams to CloudWatch via EventBridge
- The additions take about 90 minutes; the EKS control plane costs $0.10 per hour plus nodes and other usage; the authors say the code shows the pattern and is not for production
Builder's takeI like that a denied call never even redeems a token: deciding permission before fetching credentials keeps exposure minimal. Our PandaClaws multi-platform publishing agents should split the same way, with separate identities for publishing and reading data and one gateway enforcing default-deny tool policy, instead of each agent carrying its own checks.
// Background · from #AI agents
Full timeline →- Nov 9 Google measures agent distraction: 13% of sessions meet bug-referencing TODOs, and detoured sessions take 70% more steps and 77% more tokens
- Nov 9 Greenlight builds Luna, a security operations agent on AgentCore: up to 4,000 cases a month, more than 90% resolved without human intervention
- Nov 9 AWS publishes a reference architecture for a data lake MCP server: Fargate in private subnets, SELECT-only Athena tools, and one JSON metadata file to onboard a dataset